During a Tuesday hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives, experts testified that while no immediate cyber or physical threats to America’s electrical infrastructure have been identified, the Chinese government has been systematically probing for weaknesses in network systems that could be exploited in future offensive operations.
According to Michael Ball, who serves as CEO of the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center and holds a senior vice president position at the North American Electric Reliability Corp., the Volt Typhoon organization—widely believed to operate under the direction of China’s state security apparatus—has concentrated efforts on establishing persistent access to American network infrastructure. The goal appears to be positioning for potential future disruptions rather than immediate attacks.
Harry Krejsa, who directs Studies for the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy & Technology, told the Energy and Commerce Committee’s energy subcommittee that Chinese preparations suggest potential conflict over Taiwan could materialize in the near future. He explained that Beijing’s strategic approach involves preventing American intervention through attacks on civilian infrastructure designed to generate widespread panic and disorder among the U.S. population.
The vulnerability of American infrastructure stems partly from its age, Krejsa noted, particularly within the energy sector. He described the current electrical grid as frequently consisting of modern digital systems layered onto outdated analog infrastructure, creating security gaps that adversaries can penetrate.
Zach Tudor, who serves as associate laboratory director for national and homeland security at Idaho National Laboratory, identified China as representing the most consistent cyber threat facing the United States. He pointed to multiple Chinese operations—including Volt Typhoon, Salt Typhoon, and Flax Typhoon—as evidence that Chinese authorities have penetrated American energy, communications, and water infrastructure to establish conditions favorable for destructive operations should conflict arise over Taiwan. Tudor characterized this as a strategy of undermining American infrastructure without direct military engagement.
Ball acknowledged that no power outages in the United States have been conclusively linked to cyberattacks, but emphasized that the constantly evolving threat environment demands persistent monitoring and attention.
Multiple witnesses urged congressional action to expand both programs and financial resources dedicated to cyber defense initiatives. Sharla Artz, representing the Edison Electric Institute in her capacity as Xcel Energy’s vice president for security and resilience policy, advocated for sustained congressional funding of collaborative information-sharing programs. She specifically highlighted the Energy Threat Analysis Center, a pilot program administered by the Department of Energy that facilitates coordination between power sector entities and federal agencies.
Artz recommended expanding the Cybersecurity Risk Information Sharing Program, noting that such expansion requires additional government funding to improve both industry and government comprehension of emerging threats.
Tim Lindahl, serving as president and CEO of Kenergy, a cooperative utility operating from Henderson, Kentucky, pressed Congress to reauthorize the Rural and Municipal Utility Cybersecurity Program, which provides $250 million in funding through the current fiscal year. Speaking on behalf of the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, Lindahl also requested that the Department of Energy distribute $80 million in previously announced program awards from last autumn. He emphasized that continued collaboration and targeted federal investment would strengthen defensive capabilities and secure the energy infrastructure supporting the nation.
Ball additionally called for congressional reauthorization of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, which has expired but facilitated information exchange between private sector entities and government agencies.
During testimony, Representative Robert Menendez of New Jersey raised concerns that the Trump administration had undermined infrastructure protection efforts by eliminating $5.6 billion designated for state and local grid hardening and resilience programs. Menendez also cited the termination of over one thousand staff members from cybersecurity and infrastructure agencies, along with reassignment of Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency personnel to departments like Immigration and Customs Enforcement, where their specialized expertise appears mismatched with
organizational missions. He questioned whether these actions enhanced national security or improved response capabilities against escalating cyber threats.